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I. INTRODUCTION

According to a well-known story, Cardozo's Palsgrafopinion'
was born in his attendance at the discussion of the Restatement
(First)of Torts.2 If the formulations now proposed for the Restatement (Third) of Torts (proposed "Restatement") stand, the Palsgraf
case-indeed the whole notion of duty as a viable element of negligence analysis-will effectively be dead. The proposed Restatement
suggests that "duty is a non-issue" confined to unusual cases where
"special problems of principle or policy... justify the withholding of
liability."3 Duty has then merely a negative significance. It refers
not to an element necessary to establish the defendant's liability,
but to a reason for exempting the defendant from a liability that
would otherwise obtain. This proposal radically transforms the
function of duty, which Cardozo's judgement brilliantly articulated.
In this sense, the process of restating tort law will turn out to have
both created and killed the Palsgrafanalysis.

*

University Professor and Cecil A. Wright Professor of Law, University of Toronto.

1.

Palsgrafv. Long Island R.R., Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928)

2.

William F. Prosser, Palsgraf Revisited, 53 MICH. L REV. 1, 4 (1953).

3.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: GENERAL PRiNcIPLEs § 6 (Discussion Draft Apr. 5,
1999) [hereinafter Discussion Draft].
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The thoughtful paper by Professors Goldberg and Zipursky
4
gives good reason to lament the prospect of Palsgrafs passing.
Confronting the confusion in the judicial treatment of duty (the
"mess," as they candidly call it), their paper helpfully surveys the
cases and classifies the various kinds of considerations that figure
in the discussion of duty. In their view, the proposed recasting of
duty as an exemption is the legacy of the Legal Realists' skepticism
concerning the conceptual structure of tort law. Consequently, they
argue, the proposed Restatement succeeds neither in accurately restating the law of negligence nor in presenting it as a body of legal
principle. They accordingly suggest that the Augean stables should
be cleaned up rather than demolished, offering their analysis as an
effort toward that end.
Although I admire the general elegance and erudition of Professor Schwartz's proposed Restatement, I want in this Essay to reinforce the Goldberg-Zipursky criticisms of its treatment of duty. I
start with the general conception of liability that is implicit within
tort law as a normative practice. This general conception brings out
the notions of fairness and coherence that underlie tort law as a
whole. Central to this conception, as I explain in Part II, is the correlativity of the plaintiffs right and the defendant's duty. I then
ask in Part III what issues one would expect the law to address if
negligence doctrine is to be consistent with that general conception.
These issues are, first, the identification of the plaintiffs right and,
second, the nexus between that right and the defendant's duty. The
modern law of negligence has indeed dealt with these issues under
the rubric of duty, thus imbuing duty with the positive significance
that the proposed Restatement ignores. In this respect, as I contend
in Part IV, the proposed Restatement is less adequate than its
predecessor.
Throughout this Essay, my concern is not with specific duty
doctrines but with the conceptual structure of the duty inquiry. A
general section on duty in a new Restatement ought, at a minimum,
to provide lawyers and judges with suitable categories for organizing their thoughts about negligence liability. How particular cases
should be decided is another matter. One can, however, be confident
that without a conceptual structure that raises the pertinent issues,
the treatment of particular cases can hardly be satisfactory.

4. John C. P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Third Restatement and the Place of
Duty in Negligence Law, 54 VAND. L. REV. 677 (2001).
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II. THE CORRELATIVE CONCEPTION OF LIABLITY
The general conception of liability to which I refer is the following: 5 Liability treats the parties as correlatively situated. This
correlativity highlights the obvious fact that the liability of the defendant is always a liability to the plaintiff. Liability consists in a
legal relationship between two parties, each of whose position is
intelligible only in the light of the other's. In holding the defendant
liable to the plaintiff, the court is making not two separate judgments (one that awards something to the plaintiff and the other
that coincidentally takes the same from the defendant), but a single
judgment that embraces both parties in their interrelationship. The
defendant cannot be thought of as liable without reference to a
plaintiff in whose favor such liability runs. Similarly, the plaintiffs
entitlement exists only in and through the defendant's correlative
obligation.
The connection between the two parties that liability affirms
is the procedural manifestation of the injustice that liability corrects. That injustice, like liability itself, is correlatively structured:
In bringing an action against the defendant, the plaintiff is asserting that they are connected as doer and sufferer of the same injustice. As is evidenced by the judgment's simultaneous correction of
both sides of the injustice, the injustice done by the defendant and
the injustice suffered by the plaintiff are not independent items.
Rather, they are the active and passive poles of the same injustice,
so that what the defendant has done is the basis of liability only
because of what the plaintiff has suffered, and vice versa. Each
party's position is normatively significant only through the position
of the other, which is the mirror image of it.
This correlativity figures in the way that tort doctrine constructs the tort relationship. Because liability treats the parties as
doer and sufferer of the same injustice, tort law elaborates legal
categories that reflect the identical nature of the injustice on both
sides. Since the defendant, if liable, has committed the same injustice that the plaintiff has suffered, the reason the plaintiff wins
ought to be the same as the reason the defendant loses. Therefore,
in specifying the nature of the injustice, the only normative considerations that are significant are those that apply correlatively to
both parties. Normative considerations that reflect the correlative
situation of the two parties set terms for their interaction that take

5.

See generally ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW (1995).
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account of their mutual relationship and therefore are fair to both
of them. Such considerations also reflect the mutual dependence of
plaintiff and defendant for purposes of liability, thus allowing tort
law to function as a coherent enterprise in justification rather than
as a hodgepodge of factors separately relevant only to one or the
6
other of the parties.
For tort law (as well as for the law of obligations more generally), the overarching justificatory categories expressive of correlativity are those of the plaintiffs right and the defendant's corresponding duty not to interfere with that right. The injustice of tortious conduct consists in the defendant's doing something that is
incompatible with a right of the plaintiff. Right and duty are correlated when the plaintiffs right is the basis of the defendant's duty
and, conversely, when the scope of the duty includes the kind of
right-infringement that the plaintiff suffered. Under those circumstances, the reasons that justify the protection of the plaintiffs
right are the same as the reasons that justify the existence of the
defendant's duty.
III. CORRELATIVITY AND DUTY
When negligence law is conceived in terms of the correlativity of right and duty, one would expect it to attend to the following
two issues. First, what is the content of the plaintiffs right, i.e.,
what interests of the plaintiff are legally protected against the defendant's conduct? Second, how does negligence law embody the
correlativity of the defendant's duty to that right? The concept of
duty in negligence law provides the rubric under which these two
issues can be considered.
The first of these issues reflects the need to determine
whether the plaintiffs loss constitutes an infringement of something to which the plaintiff has a right. Being harmed at the defendant's hand is merely a fact about the plaintiffs history that in itself has no correlative normative significance; only when the harm
signifies the defendant's violation of the plaintiff's right do the parties occupy correlative normative positions. Conversely, if the loss
of which the plaintiff is complaining is not the subject matter of a

6.
For an account of the role of correlativity in contemporary tort theory, see Ernest J.
Weinrib, Correlativity, Personality, and the Emerging Consensus on Corrective Justice, 2
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES LAW 249 (2000).
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right, then the defendant has no duty with respect to it. In the old
language of the law, the case is then one of damnum sine iniuria.
The supposed absence of a right accounts for some of the
situations where the common law does not recognize (or has been
reluctant to recognize) the existence of a duty. In circumstances of
non-feasance, for example, the entitlement claimed is not merely to
one's own physical integrity-which ex hypothes! the defendant has
not endangered-but to the defendant's positive assistance. Under
the common law, however, one has no general right to be benefited
by another. Similarly, cases of economic loss are problematic where
the harm flows not from the violation of the plaintiffs proprietary
right but from the defendant's interference with a resource or facility belonging to a third party. 7 The perceived absence of a right in
the plaintiff may also explain, at least in part, the law's slowness to
recognize negligence liability for emotional distress and for prenatal injury. In the former case, freedom from emotional trauma was
perhaps regarded as too speculative or insubstantial to count as a
right. Similarly, in the latter case the common law position that
legal personality begins at birth allowed prenatal injuries not to be
viewed as violations of the child's rights. Of course, whether the law
has correctly dealt with these various claims is a matter for legal
argument, informed by evolving notions about the significance of
particular interests and about the adequacy of the evidence needed
to support a claim. The point here is merely that the law's treatment of duty in these contexts can be understood as attempts to
determine whether what the plaintiff has suffered at the defendant's hand is the infringement of a right.
The second issue is that, given the existence of a right in the
plaintiff, the defendant's duty has to be correlative to it. This
means that the content of the plaintiffs right has to be the object of
the defendant's duty. In order to be liable, the defendant must have
been negligent with respect to the plaintiffs right. Otherwise, the
parties are not the doer and sufferer of the same injustice, and the
reason for the plaintiffs winning would not be the same as the reason for the defendant's losing.
Cardozo's treatment of duty in the Palsgrafcase gives paradigmatic legal expression to the notion that the defendant's duty is
to be construed as correlative to the plaintiffs right. Because in
that case the defendant's conduct was not wrongful toward the
plaintiff (although it was arguably wrongful toward someone else),
7. Peter Benson, The Basis for Excluding Liability for Economic Loss in Tort, in
PHILOSOPIHCAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 427 (David Owen ed., 1995).

808

VANDERBILT LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 54:3:803

the defendant was held not to be under a duty with respect to the
plaintiffs loss. Only if the wrongfulness of the defendant's riskcreation was relative to the plaintiffs right could the parties be regarded as doer and sufferer of the same injustice. Cardozo's
achievement was to align the relational significance of risk, as a
foreseeable effect on another, with the relational nature of tortious
wrongdoing as the violation of the plaintiffs right. Consequently,
the plaintiff had to be within the class of persons whose rights were
foreseeably affected by the defendant's unreasonable creation of
risk.
Although he focused on this second issue, Cardozo alluded to
the first one as well. "Negligence is not actionable unless it involves
' 8
the invasion of a legally protected interest, the violation of a right.
Because "the commission of a wrong imports the violation of a
right,"9 the plaintiff is precluded from recovering unless the defendant's conduct is a wrong in relation to that right. Hence, "[w]hat
the plaintiff must show is 'a wrong' to herself, i.e., a violation of her
own right."'10 That the plaintiff had a right to her bodily security
was not disputed in the case, but the defendant's action was not
wrongful relative to that right. Thus Cardozo affirmed that the existence of a right in the plaintiff is presupposed in the requirement
that the duty breached by the defendant be a wrong toward her.
Cardozo's opinion thus presents the two interrelated functions of the inquiry into the defendant's duty. The first issue is
whether the plaintiffs damaged interest has the status of a right,
because it is only to a right that the defendant's duty can be correlative. The second issue is whether that correlativity obtains in
the case at hand, i.e., whether the defendant breached a duty correlative to that right by creating an unreasonable risk to persons
such as the plaintiff. When these two issues are brought together,
the question of duty produces a structure of inquiry geared to ascertaining whether the parties can plausibly be regarded as the doer
and sufferer of the same injustice.

8.
9.
10.

Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., Co., 162 N.E. 99, 99 (N.Y. 1928).
Id. at 101.
Id. at 100.
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IV. DuTY IN THE THIRD RESTATEMENT

The proposed Restatement submerges these issues (and others)" under a general section declaring that, in unusual cases
where special problems of principle or policy justify it, a court may
determine that the defendant owes no duty to the plaintiff. In its
comment to this section, the proposed Restatement notes that courts
often refer to duty as a prerequisite of liability. However, because
the duty is couched in terms of reasonable care or compliance with
the legal standard of reasonable conduct, "[t]hese formulations
merely give expression to the point that negligence is the standard
of liability."12 The proposed Restatement contends that drawing attention to this obvious point is redundant. Therefore, it concludes,
duty is usually a non-issue that surfaces only in the unusual cases
where the special problems justify denying its existence.
My comments in the previous Section indicate that more is
at stake in the duty inquiry than a redundant reference to the
standard of care. The duty inquiry has a definite structure that reflects the normative connection between what the defendant has
done and what the plaintiff has suffered. This structure takes a
recognizable legal form through the requirement that a court determine, first, whether the plaintiffs loss is in principle worthy of
legal protection as a right, and second, whether the plaintiff is
within the unreasonable risk created by the defendant's conduct. If
the function of a Restatement of the general principles of negligence
law is to orient lawyers and judges to the issues that they ought to
consider, the proposed Restatement's section on duty is a lost opportunity. 13
This criticism of the proposed Restatement can be confirmed
by the case that the Restatement itself singles out as resembling its
11. Goldberg and Zipursky usefully outline four senses of duty that can be discerned in the
cases: i) whether the defendant was under an obligation to act with vigilance of the plaintiffs
interests, (ii) whether there is an appropriate nexus between the defendant's breach and the
duty owed to the plaintiff, (iii) whether the defendant's act was a breach as a matter of law and
therefore is not to be left to the jury, and iv) whether a policy based exemption is applicable.
Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 4, at Part V. My comments here cover roughly the same ground
as the first two of these senses.
12. Discussion Draft, supra note 3, § 6 cmt. a.
13. The duty section of the proposed Restatement may ultimately prove to be self.defeating.
One can judge the unusual only by reference to the usual. In order to coherently elaborate "the
special problems of principle or policy that justify the withholding of liability," one needs a clear
sense of the principles or policies that are constitutive of liability. Only then can one work out
their justifiable limits. By omitting mention of the issues that are essential to the duty inquiry
and of the principles that they represent, the proposed Restatement directs its users to potentially unstable exceptions.
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position. In Fazzolari v. Portland School District No. 1J,14 the Supreme Court of Oregon, after an illuminating survey of the academic literature on duty, concluded that, if one leaves aside situations where the plaintiff is pointing to an obligation arising from
the defendant's particular status or relationship, duty figures only
negatively to limit the reach of the common law's generalized standards. "Duty remains a formal element in the plaintiffs claim only
in the sense that the plaintiff loses if the defendant persuades a
court to phrase such a limit in terms of 'no-duty.' "16 The closeness
of this formulation to the proposed Restatement's is evident.
The question then arises, however, of how to characterize the
generalized standards to which the Oregon Supreme Court refers.
The Court's language is instructive:
In short, unless the parties invoke a status, a relationship, or a particular standard of conduct that creates, defines, or limits the defendant's duty, the issue of liability for harm actually resulting from the defendant's conduct properly depends
on whether that conduct unreasonably created a 6foreseeable risk to a protected interest of the kind of harm that befell the plaintiff.

Although eschewing the language of duty, the Court in the italicized words has nonetheless included reference to the sorts of issues
germane to the correlative conception of duty. To be sure, the significance of this reference is equivocal. On the one hand, the Court
acknowledges that, to be successful, the plaintiff requires both a
protected interest and harm within the scope of the unreasonable
risk to that interest. On the other hand, however, the Court's
treatment of duty means that the location of these issues remains
unmarked within the conceptual structure of negligence law. Why,
one might wonder, does the Court empty duty of its usual content if
it nonetheless views that content as a condition of liability? Be that
as it may, the proposed Restatement that draws on this case is more
radical: It makes no reference to these issues anywhere, leaving the
mistaken impression that they do not exist. 17

14. Fazzolari v. Portland Sch. Dist., 734 P.2d 1326 (Or. 1987) (en banc) (Linde, J.).
15. Id. at 1331.
16. Id. at 1336 (emphasis added).
17. This may be the result of two suspect organizational considerations. First, the proposed
Restatement takes physical injury as the core of negligence (apparently because of the preponderant number of such cases), with the general principles being concerned with the core so understood. The fact that the proposed Restatement is dealing with physical injury then serves to
mask the significance of the omission of reference to protected interests, since bodily integrity is
usually a protected interest. See Discussion Draft, supra note 3, § 6 Reporter's Note. However,
principles are general not because they deal with a significant number of cases but because they
elucidate the conceptual structure of the phenomenon as a whole. Moreover, even in connection
with physical injury, the question of whether the plaintiffs interest is protected against the
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In this respect the proposed Restatement is less felicitous
than its predecessor. The Restatement (Second) of Torts, Section 281
begins its statement of the elements of a negligence action as follows:
The actor is liable for an invasion of an interest of another, iMi
(a) the interest is protected against unintentional invasion, and
(b)the conduct of the actor is negligent with respect to the other, or a class of persons within which he is included...

The two conditions listed are exactly those required by the correlative conception of liability. The Restatement (Second) does not, of
course, incorporate them into a general conception of negligence, as
I did above. Moreover, the Restatement (Second) proceeds to flesh
out this reference to protected interests by a more particular treatment. But the important point is that the Restatement (Second),
unlike the proposed Restatement, recognizes the necessity for considering these issues, and consequently includes them in its presentation of the structure of negligence liability.
The professed aim of the proposed Restatement is to clarify
the meaning of the basic concepts of tort law.' 8 Unfortunately, the
section on duty does not succeed in this aim. The section reduces
duty to a non-issue that lies dormant except when jolted into life by
special problems that justify the withholding of liability. By thus
draining duty of positive significance, the proposed Restatement

defendant's conduct may nonetheless arise; otherwise, the proposed Restatement's negative formulation would itself be otiose. (For an interesting recent Canadian example, see Dobson v.
Dobson (1999), 174 Dom. L. Rep. (4th) 1 (S.C.C.), dealing with the liability of a mother for negligently causing damage to her own child while in the womb.) Furthermore, a possible consequence of hiving off physical injury is that there may be a different principle of duty when one
comes to other kinds of harms, like economic loss, even though the conception of duty in modem
negligence law is supposed to be general. As Lord Atkin put it in his classic judgment in
Donoghue v. Stevenson, (1932) App. Cas. 562, at 580: "ITIhere must be, and is, some general
conception of relations giving rise to a duty of care, of which the particular cases found in the
books are but instances."
Second, the proposed Restatement has not yet dealt with proximate cause. The issue of the
correlativity of the defendant's wrongful behavior to the plaintiffs right can be dealt with as a
matter of proximate cause as well as of duty. For the conceptual relationship between the two,
see WEINRIB, supra note 5, at 158. As Leon Green observed in his article Duty, Risks, Causation
Doctrines, 41 Tx. L REV. 42 (1962), they are "spongy terms, each capable of absorbing the
meaning of the other...
Indeed, the Oregon Supreme Court's formulation in terms of kind of
harm sounds like proximate cause rather than duty. But the court's opinion was as inhospitable
to what proximate cause as to duty, Fazzolari,734 P.2d at 1330, so that, if this judgment is the
inspiration of the proposed Restatement's approach, there is no reason to suppose that correlativity will be handled by proximate cause either.
18. Discussion Draft, supra note 3, foreword.
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effaces duty's role-certified and confirmed by Palsgraf-to be a
marker of the correlativity that obtains between the plaintiffs right
and the defendant's wrong. This role in turn is crucial to the capacity of negligence law to be fair to both parties within a framework of
coherent justification. In modern negligence law, the duty inquiry
has a structure that can be stated positively, consisting in the elucidation of the plaintiffs right and of the nexus between that right
and the defendant's conduct. If there is to be a new Restatement
(Third) of Torts: General Principles, a recapitulation of that structure should be included. The new Restatement will then be truer to
the cases, more useful to those who consult it, more explicit about
the function of the duty inquiry, and more consonant with the correlative nature of tort liability.

